# The Costa Rica's rice AMS is not a subsidy but a fake market price support

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This paper is a comment on the AFP article of 3 August 2010 "Gobierno de Costa Rica en apuros con OMC por subsidio a arroceros" (see in the annex).

This case is a very interesting one indeed and will help to demystify the WTO Agreement on agriculture (AoA) rules.

There are two types of agricultural subsidies: domestic and at export.

# 1) Export subsidies:

Costa Rica did not notify any, let alone for rice since it is a large net importer as shown by the table 1 below. Furthermore, as shown in table 2, 95% of net imports in value have come from the US and, a statistical curiosity, more than 100% in volume!

Table 1 – Costa Rica's trade in rice from 2006 to 2009, in volume and value

1 4	Tuble 1 Costa Rica's trade in free from 2000 to 2005; in votame and value							
	2006	2007	2008	2009	Average			
		In 1	000 \$					
Exports	218	1,389	2,559	1,485	1,413			
Imports	38,579	63,105	50,700	44,519	49,226			
Balance	-38,361	-61,716	-48,141	-43,034	-47,813			
	·	In to	onnes	•				
Exports	1,033	5,076	10,412	5,591	5,528			
Imports	156,994	187,299	105,697	113,959	140,987			
Balance	-155,961	-182,223	-95,285	-108,368	-135,459			

Source: UN Comtrade, Rev.3, rice: code 042, Costa Rica: code 188

Table 2 – Costa Rica's trade in rice with the US from 2006 to 2009, in volume and value

	2006	2007	2008	2009	Average
		In 10	000 \$		
Exports	-	-	-	3,795	
Imports	38,328	60,205	47,276	39,608	46,354
Balance	-38,328	-60,205	-47,276	35,813	-45,406
		In to	nnes		
Exports	-	-	-	608	152
Imports	156,488	182,604	102,560	104,142	136,449
Balance	-156,488	-182,604	-102,560	-103,534	-136,297

Source: UN Comtrade, Rev.3, rice: code 042, Costa Rica: code 188; USA: code 842.

What is more interesting is to underscore the average US subsidies on its rice exports to Costa Rica from 2006 to 2009 have been at least of \$11,740 million or of \$78.80 per tonne, corresponding to 24.07% of the US FOB price (table 3).

Let us stress that these subsidies are largely underestimated for three reasons:

1- The crop insurances subsidies of the EWG take only into account the premium subsidies

- 2- The irrigation subsidies on rice are not mentioned although they are huge
- 3- The indirect subsidies of the non-product specific AMS and of the green box (excluding the domestic food aid) attributable to rice in proportion of the share of the rice production value in the whole US agricultural production value are not either taken into account.

Table 3 – US rice subsidies on exports to Costa Rica (CR), from 2006 to 2009

Tonnes and dollars	2006	2007	2008	2009	Average
US rice production	5,737,018	5,949,143	6,006,731	6,481,914	6,043,702
US rice subsidies	545,151,113	485,936,596	439,775,626	434,103,182	476,241,629
Subsidy per ton	95.02	82.68	73.21	66.97	78.80
Exports to CR (t)	156,994,581	183,257,369	126,854,297	113,563,966	136,449
Export subsidies/CR	14,917,631	15,151,721	9,287,003	7,605,379	11,740,434
FOB US price	233.70	316.79	408.48	383.35	327.37
CIF CR price	244.93	329.70	460.96	380.33	339.72
Per t sub/FOB price	40.66%	26.10%	17.92%	17.47%	24.07%

Sources: USDA (http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1229) and the Environment Working Group (EWG) for its subsidies data base (http://farm.ewg.org/progdetail.php?fips=00000&progcode=rice)

# 2) Domestic subsidies:

Costa Rica is an extraordinary case that the civil society must circulate worldwide to illustrate the absurdity of the WTO rules on domestic support.

a) The rice growers are perfectly right: the minimum price for rice has nothing to do with a subsidy, it is just an administered price that the government has fixed in order to secure a minimum supply of this basic staple, the more so as, we have just seen it, there are already huge net imports, having even exceeded largely the domestic production in 2006 and 2007 as shown in table 2. Therefore the government was fully wise to raise the minimal (guaranteed) price in line with the increased price of imports. This has at least fostered the domestic production by 38% and reduced imports by 43.6% from 2007 to 2008. Unfortunately the government has very little leeway to raise its applied tariff on rice as it is already at the bound level for husked (or brown) rice and broken rice (35%), although there is some room for semimiled rice for which the average applied level is 17.5% (for a bound level of also 35%) and for paddy (rice in the husk) for which the bound level is 45% and the applied level 23.3%. At least we see that the increased minimal price has been effective to raise domestic production (FAOSTAT does not provide the production data for 2009).

Table 4 – Costa Rica's production of rice and net imports from 2006 to 2008

Tonnes	2006	2007	2008	Average
Paddy production	175,782	179,577	248,045	201,135
Rice equivalent (65%)	114,258	116,725	161,229	130,737
Net imports/production	136.5%	156.1%	59.1%	3.6%
Import price in \$/tonne	245.74	336.92	479.67	
Guaranteed price "	269.54	311.22	506.65	

Source: FAOSTAT

# b) The AMS linked to the administered price of rice is meaningless

<u>1- According to the present rule</u> on the product-specific AMS (aggregate measurement of support) linked to an administered price, the government is right in saying that it has exceeded

<u>its AMS commitment</u> (see lista LXXXV) since 2007 for the total AMS although only for 2008 and 2009 for the rice AMS, as shown in table 4:

	Lista LX	XXV - COSTA RICA	
PARTE IV - PR	ODUCTOS AGROPECUARIOS:	COMPROMISOS DE LIMITACIÓN DE L	AS SUBVENCIONES
		Acuerdo sobre la Agricultura)	
	SECCIÓN I - Ayuda inter	rna: Compromisos sobre la MGA total	
MGA TOTAL DE BASE	Período de aplicación	Niveles de compromiso consolidados	Cuadros justificantes y documentos
	1995-2004	anuales y final	de referencia pertinentes
		(Miles de US\$)	
1		2	3
18 399	1995	18 153	AGST/CRI
	1996	17 908	Cuadro justificantes 4,5,6 y 8
	1997	17 663	
	1998	17 417	
	1999	17 172	
	2000	16 927	
	2001	16 681	
	2002	16 436	
	2003	16 191	
	2004	15 945	

Source: lista CRI4-101 in http://www.wto.org/spanish/thewto\_s/countries\_s/costa\_rica\_s.htm

Table 5 – Rate of "overspent" of the allowed total AMS and rice AMS in Costa Rica

Twelve Time of System of the this west total This that I was in Costa The						
\$1,000	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Bound total AMS	15,945	15,945	15,945	15,945	15,945	15,945
Current total AMS	1,995.58	5,798	8,675	17,173	62,478	91,744
Rice AMS	1,775	3,872	8,043	15,716	62,478	91,744
Total AMS "overspent"	none	none	none	7.7%	292%	475%
Rice "overspent"	none	none	none	none	292%	475%
Guaranteed price	232.78	244.91	269.54	311.22	506.65	581.30

Source: notifications to the WTO (http://www.wto.org/french/tratop\_f/agric\_f/agric\_f.htm)

# 2 – However the present AoA rule is absurd and this "overspent" does not exist!

First the Costa Rica government has mixed up "subvenciones" with "ajuda interna" in the title of its "lista" above when it wrote "compromisos de limitacion de las subvenciones".

Indeed this rice AMS is not made of actual subsidies but of a fake "market price support" as a result of its absurd calculation modalities defined in the AoA<sup>1</sup>. Because this MPS is the gap between the administered price of the current year and the average world reference price of the 1986-88 period, a gap multiplied by the production of the current year which might benefit from this administered price. It is clearly a fake market price support for four reasons:

i) As the average world price of the 1986-88 remains fixed, the gap between the current administered price and this past fixed price does not represent an actual market price support, which would be the case if the gap were calculated with the current world price.

ii) Precisely the gap between the current administered price and the current world price (represented by the CIF import price) has been 3.6 times lower on average from 2006 to 2009 than the gap between the current administered price and the 19986-88 world price or, another way to tell the same thing, the current administered price has been on average 86.4% higher than the 1986-88 world price against only 14.8% higher than the current CIF price. Even if

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> J. Berthelot, Agriculture: Doha talks, market price support and Enron accounting, *Third World Network Info Service on WTO and Trade Issues* (Aug08/13), 15 August 2008, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/wto.info/twninfo20080813.htm

the guaranteed price was only 48.8% higher than the current CIF price in 2009, it was still 159.8 higher than the 1986-88 world price.

Table 6 – Gaps between the 1986-88 world price, current world price and guaranteed price

\$ per tonne	2006	2007	2008	2009	Average
1986-88 world reference price	223.78	223.78	223.78	223.78	223.78
Current guaranteed price	269.54	311.22	506.65	581.30	417.18
Gap current guaranteed-1986/88 prices	45.76	87.44	282.87	357.52	193.40
Current CIF import price	245.74	336.92	479.67	390.66	363.25
Gap current guaranted-current CIF prices	23.80	-25.70	26.98	190.64	53.93
Current guaranteed price/1986-88 price	105.7%	139.1%	226.4%	259.8%	186.4%
Current guaranteed price/current CIF price	109.7%	92.4%	105.6%	148.8%	114.8%

iii) Even then in 2009 the 190.64 \$/t gap between the administered price and the current CIF price did not represent a subsidy because the government did not pay anything to the rice growers, the middlemen purchasing the rice had just to pay this minimal price, that they passed on clearly to consumers. But in 2007 the middlemen, likely not the consumers, had benefitted from a minimal domestic price which was 8.3% lower than the current world price, and in fact 46.1% lower than the tariff paid import price, even though this minimal price was 39.1% higher than the 1986-88 world price. Given this gap between the tariff paid import price and the minimal price it is likely that two things occurred: the government may have lowered the tariff as many DCs did in that period (also in 2008) and it is likely that the farmers received actual prices higher than the minimal price.

iv) In any case the domestic administered (minimal) price would not work without the 35% tariff, so that, once the tariff paid, the average current CIF price of 363.35 \$/t from 2006 to 2009 has become 490.4 \$/t, which was 17.5% higher than the average guaranteed price. Admittedly this was not true in 2009 where the tariff paid import price was of 527.4 \$/t, lower than the minimal price of 581.3 \$/t and I guess that the middlemen did not pay the minimal price to the farmers.

# 3) Broader comments on the AMS linked to administered prices

The largest part of the reduction of the applied total AMS of the EU, US and Japan since 1995 is attributable to the elimination or reduction of their product-specific AMSs linked to administered prices. These fake market price supports (MPS) won't have had any impact on their domestic prices without having coexisted with other more determinant measures: import protection, export subsidies, production quotas, set aside, external and domestic food aid. Reducing this fake MPS AMSs has been the main means, particularly for the EU and Japan, to reduce their total AMS without any reduction in their actual subsidies, or rather having allowed to increase them.

How many WTO Members know that, in the 1995-00 period, the EU subsidy component of its average annual AMS has represented only €4.822 billion or 10% of the €48.425 billion notified? And that the US proportion of the MPS in its notified AMS had been of 56.9% on the same period?

The inconsistency of this fake MPS has been stressed by the World Bank, FAO and several academics. William R. Cline stated in the USDA 2007 Agriculture Outlook Forum: "The bound AMS contained about \$6 billion of pure fiction, a remarkable concept called 'Market

Price Support' (MPS. This accounting concept equals the difference between the domestic administered price and the 1986-88 world price. Yes, 1986-88, not today – already a clue that this concept is a fiction. There is no actual taxpayer money paid out for the MPS, it is pure accounting. Japan suddenly cut its reported AMS subsidies by billions of dollars in the late 1990s by eliminating its administered prices, with no change in agricultural protection whatsoever. So the first thing that should be done in Geneva is to redefine the Amber Box AMS to exclude the Market Price Support as part of the calculated bound level. Getting rid of the phony subsidy will make it easier to get rid of phony subsidy cuts"<sup>2</sup>.

For H. de Gorter and J. D. Cook: "Another source of water in domestic support ceilings is the peculiar manner in which the AMS is calculated. In addition to trade-distorting, taxpayerfunded domestic subsidies, the AMS includes "market price support," defined as eligible production multiplied by the difference between the administered price and a fixed world reference price. The product of that operation does not depict "domestic support" per se. Instead, it is a faulty measure of support provided at the border through tariffs, import quotas or export subsidies since and administered price cannot be sustained without supporting border measures. Reducing or even eliminating an official support price without altering border protection need not have any market impact. Japan is a case in point. There the official support price for rice was eliminated in 1997, and Japan's total AMS, as notified to the WTO, dropped by \$20 billion. However, because the country made no changes in import controls, effective support remained the same. So a substantial portion of the water in Japan's total AMS of approximately \$34 billion (table 2) can be attributed to an adjustment made to an administered price in order to "achieve" reduction commitments without actually reducing support. As discussed below, the redundancy of this "price-gap" component of the AMS must be recognized when assessing the impact of any given cuts"<sup>3</sup>

The suppression the 1<sup>st</sup> July 2002 of the intervention price of beef has allowed the EU to cut its total AMS by €1.9 billion from one day to the other, without any impact on the market price which has increased in the following years because of a high import protection. In the EU, the sugar AMS linked to its intervention price amounted to €.9 billion in 2000-01 and comparable amounts the preceding years, although public purchases at the intervention price have only occurred once in 25 years, because high domestic prices have been maintained through a high import protection and production quotas. The AMS linked to the intervention prices of butter and skimmed milk powder amounted to €.951 billion in 2000-01, but the EU expenses on dairy have only reached €1.907 billion. Conversely the absence of administered prices, then of AMS, for poultry and eggs in Canada did not prevent their high prices due to a high import protection and an efficient supply management.

Therefore notifying these fake MPS has only blurred the negotiations and misled WTO Members, as we see now with the Costa Rica Ministers of trade, economy and agriculture. The more surprising is that these AMS supports continue to be presented as the most trade-distorting ones. What they are clearly distorting is the understanding of the WTO Members. Therefore the AMSs linked to administered prices should be eliminated since they have allowed developed countries to look like reducing much their coupled supports when they have increased instead their so-called decoupled subsidies.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> William R. Cline, *The Doha Round, Agriculture, and the Developing Countries*, USDA, 2007 Agriculture Outlook Forum, USDA 01-02/03/07

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Harry de Gorter et J. Daniel Cook, *Domestic Support in Agriculture: The Struggle for Meaningful Disciplines*, 2005, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054-1126812419270/7.DomesticSupport\_updated\_on12Dec05.pdf

Professor Tim Josling, of Stanford University, is one of the most distinguished experts in the field of agricultural trade. He is the "father" of the OECD indicators of agricultural trade, devised in the early 1980's, among which the PSE (producer support estimate). Tim Josling was one of the 4 panelists of the seminar on "Options for Pursuing Agricultural Trade Liberalization" organized by the International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council the 1st December 2009 in Geneva during the WTO Ministerial Conference. Reacting to a question asked from the floor, Professor Josling has confirmed that the market price support component of the AMS is meaningless and should be eliminated altogether from the calculation of the AMS<sup>4</sup>.

Yet, in the Doha Round negotiations, the EU and US offers to cut their allowed AMS by respectively 70% and 60% at the end of the Doha Round implementation period – in relation to the level authorized during the Uruguay Round implementation period 1995-2000, which is the base period for reduction commitments – rests mainly on the elimination of their remaining market price supports (MPS). This was the main stake in the EU CAP "health check" of 2008. But the level of the EU actual subsidies has not diminished: instead the EU has, year after year, transferred most of its amber and blue box subsidies in the alleged "fully decoupled" green box.

# **Annexes**

# 1) Gobierno de Costa Rica en apuros con OMC por subsidio a arroceros

Fuente AFP, Martes, 3 de agosto: CostaRica-Comercio-Arroz-OMC http://economia.terra.com.co/noticias/noticia.aspx?idNoticia=201008032051\_AFP\_205100-TX-JGC03

El gobierno de Costa Rica reconoció este martes que los subsidios estatales a los productores de arroz sobrepasan los límites aceptados por la Organización Mundial de Comercio (OMC), y aseguró que busca una "solución apropiada" al problema.

El ministro de la Presidencia, Marco Vargas, dijo que es consciente de que la situación podría acarrearle sanciones comerciales al país, pero afirmó que existe la disposición a hacer correcciones."El asunto está siendo analizado por las ministras de Comercio Exterior, Economía y Agricultura y se van a hacer los ajustes que haya que hacer", declaró el funcionario en rueda de prensa.

El ex ministro de Comercio Exterior Marco Vinicio Ruiz advirtió en una carta a su sucesora, Anabelle González, de que el país está otorgando subsidios hasta de 475% por encima de los límites tolerados por la OMC, reveló este martes un diario local."Nuestro país está a las puertas de una grave disputa comercial en la OMC con todas las posibilidades de perderla y sufrir serias sanciones comerciales de parte de otros miembros de esa organización", apuntó Ruiz en su misiva.

Aunque el gobierno costarricense no da dinero a los productores de arroz, otorga el subsidio por medio de un mecanismo de precio mínimo por tonelada, que los industrializadores del grano están obligados a pagar a los productores. El monto del "subsidio" ha venido creciendo

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Solidarité, *Professor Tim Josling acknowledges implicitly that the EU and US offers to cut their agricultural trade distorting subsidies in the Doha Round is impossible*, Press release, Geneva, December 2, 2009

desde 2007, año en que sobrepasó los límites en 46%, hasta llegar en 2009 a ser 475% superior a lo aceptado por la OMC, según Ruiz.

No obstante, los arroceros organizados aseguraron que la fijación de un precio mínimo no constituye un subsidio, porque el gobierno lo que hace es definir el precio de conformidad con los costos de producción. El arroz, que constituye una de las bases de la alimentación de los costarricenses, es de los pocos productos que aún tienen un precio fijado por decreto del Poder Ejecutivo.

# 2) Costa Rica's notifications of its domestic agricultural amber box subsidies at the WTO from 2004 to 2009

Table DS:1

#### DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Costa Rica

#### REPORTING PERIOD: 2004

Current Total Aggregate Measurement of Support

Total AMS commitment level for period in question	Currency	Current Total AMS	
(from Section I of Part IV of the Schedule)	(from Section I of Part IV of the Schedule)	(from attached Supporting Tables)	
1	3	4	
15,945.00	US\$ thousand1	1,995.58	

Average exchange rate for 2004: C 437.93 to US\$1 (Source: Central Bank of Costa Rica).

Supporting Table DS:5

## DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Costa Rica

#### REPORTING PERIOD: 2004

Product-Specific Aggregate Measurements of Support: Market Price Support

Description of basic products	Calendar year/season beginning	Measure type(s)	Applied administered price (US\$/tonne) <sup>1</sup>	External reference price (generally from AGST/) (US\$/tonne)	Eligible production (tonnes)	Associated fees/levies (US\$)	Total market price support (US\$)	Data source
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 ((4-5*6)-7)	9
Rice	2004	Price support	232.78	223.78	197,211.00	0.00	1,774,899.00	Ministry of Foreign Trade on the basis of data provided by CONARROZ

Average annual price. Legislation establishing administered prices for 2004:
(i) Executive Decree No. 31734 of 1 April 2004, published in Official Journal (*La Gaceta*) No. 68 of 6 April 2004. The price was applied from 6 April 2004 to 2 June 2004.
(ii) Executive Decree No. 31816 of 21 May 2004, published in Official Journal (*La Gaceta*) No. 108 of 3 June 2004. The price was applied as from 3 June 2004.

Table DS:1

#### DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Costa Rica

## REPORTING PERIOD: 2005

Current Total Aggregate Measurement of Support

Total AMS commitment level for period in question	Currency	Current Total AMS
(from Section I of Part IV of the Schedule)	(from Section I of Part IV of the Schedule)	(from attached Supporting Tables)
1	3	4
15,945.00	US\$ thousand <sup>1</sup>	5,797.91

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Average exchange rate for 2005: C 477.88 to US\$1 (Source: Central Bank of Costa Rica).

#### DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Costa Rica

#### REPORTING PERIOD: 2005

Product-Specific Aggregate Measurements of Support: Market Price Support

Description of basic products	Calendar year/season beginning	Measure type(s)	Applied administered price $(US\$/tonne)^{1}$	External reference price (generally from AGST/) (US\$/tonne)	Eligible production (tonnes)	Associated fees/levies (US\$)	Total market price support (US\$)	Data source
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 ((4-5*6)-7)	9
Rice	2005	Price support	244.91	223.78	183,251.00	0.00	3,872,093.63	Ministry of Foreign Trade on the basis of data provided by CONARROZ

- <sup>1</sup> Average annual price. Legislation establishing administered prices for 2005:

  (i) Executive Decree No. 31816 of 21 May 2004, published in Official Journal (*La Gaceta*) No. 108 of 3 June 2004. The price was applied from 3 June 2004 to 18 April 2005.

  (ii) Executive Decree No. 32305 of 12 April 2005, published in Official Journal (*La Gaceta*) No. 74 of 19 April 2005. The price was applied as from 19 April 2005.

Table DS:1

#### DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Costa Rica

#### REPORTING PERIOD: 2006

Current Total Aggregate Measurement of Support

Total AMS commitment level for period in question	Currency	Current Total AMS (from attached Supporting Tables)	
(from Section I of Part IV of the Schedule)	(from Section I of Part IV of the Schedule)		
1	3		
15,945.00	US\$ thousand <sup>1</sup>	8,675.54	

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Average exchange rate for 2006: C 511.25 to US\$1 (Source: Central Bank of Costa Rica).

Supporting Table DS:5

## DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Costa Rica

## REPORTING PERIOD: 2006

Product-Specific Aggregate Measurements of Support: Market Price Support

Description of basic products	Calendar year/season beginning	Measure type(s)	Applied administered price (US\$/tonne) <sup>1</sup>	External reference price (generally from AGST/) (US\$/tonne)	Eligible production (tonnes)	Associated fees/levies (US\$)	Total market price support (US\$)	Data source
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 ((4-5*6)-7)	9
Rice	2006	Price support	269.54	223.78	175,775.00	0.00	8,043,464.00	Ministry of Foreign Trade on the basis of data provided by CONARROZ

- Average annual price. Legislation establishing administered prices for 2006:

  (i) Executive Decree No. 32305 of 12 April 2005, published in Official Journal (*La Gaceta*) No. 74 of 19 April 2005. The price was applied from 19 April 2005 to 23 March 2006.

  (ii) Executive Decree No. 32956 of 14 March 2006, published in Official Journal (*La Gaceta*) No. 60 of 24 March 2006. The price was applied from 24 March 2006 to 29 November 2006.

  (iii) Executive Decree No. 333441 of 27 October 2006, published in Official Journal (*La Gaceta*) No. 229 of 29 November 2006. The price was applied from 29 November 2006.

Table DS:1

## DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Costa Rica

## REPORTING PERIOD: 2007

Current Total Aggregate Measurement of Support

Total AMS commitment level for period in question	Currency	Current Total AMS		
(from Section I of Part IV of the Schedule)	(from Section I of Part IV of the Schedule)	(from attached Supporting Tables)		
1	3	4		
15,945.00	US\$ thousand <sup>1</sup>	17,173.07		

<sup>1</sup> Average exchange rate for 2007: C 518.69 to US\$1 (Source: Central Bank of Costa Rica).

#### DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Costa Rica

#### REPORTING PERIOD: 2007

Product-Specific Aggregate Measurements of Support: Market Price Support

Description of basic products	Calendar year/season beginning	Measure type(s)	Applied administered price (US\$/tonne) <sup>1</sup>	External reference price (generally from AGST/) (US\$/tonne)	Eligible production (tonnes)	Associated fees/levies (US\$)	Total market price support (US\$)	Data source
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 ((4-5*6)-7)	9
Rice	2007	Price support	311.22	223.78	179,729.00	0.00	15,715,503.76	Ministry of Foreign Trade on the basis of data provided by CONARROZ

- Average annual price. Legislation establishing administered prices for 2007:

  (i) Executive Decree No. 33441 of 27 October 2006, published in Official Journal (*La Gaceta*) No. 229 of 29 November 2006. The price was applied from 29 November 2006 to 13 March 2007.

  (ii) Executive Decree No. 33622 of 15 February 2007, published in Official Journal (*La Gaceta*) No. 27 of 14 March 2007. The price was applied from 14 March 2007 to 6 September 2007.

  (iv) Executive Decree No. 33499 of 9 August 2007, published in Official Journal (*La Gaceta*) No. 172 of 7 September 2007. Price was applied from 7 September 2007 to 29 November 2007.

  (v) Executive Decree No. 34111 of 16 November 2007, published in Official Journal (*La Gaceta*) No. 231 of 30 December 2007. The price was applied from 30 November 2007 to 26 May 2008.

  (v) Executive Decree No. 34525 of 8 May 2008, published in Official Journal (*La Gaceta*) No. 101 of 27 May 2008. The price was applied as from 27 May 2008.

Table DS:1

#### DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Costa Rica

#### REPORTING PERIOD: 2008

Current Total Aggregate Measurement of Support

Total AMS commitment level for period in question	Currency	Current total AMS		
(from Section I of Part IV of the Schedule)	(from Section I of Part IV of the Schedule)	(from attached Supporting Tables)		
1	2	3		
15,945.00	US\$ thousand1	62,477.56		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Average exchange rate for 2008: C526.24 to US\$1 (Source: Central Bank of Costa Rica).

Supporting Table DS:5

## DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Costa Rica

#### REPORTING PERIOD: 2008

Product-Specific Aggregate Measurements of Support: Market Price Support

Description of basic product	c Calendar / marketing year beginning	Measure type(s)	Applied administere price	ed External reference price (generally from AGST/)	Eligible production	Associated fees/levies	Total market price support	Data source
			(US\$/tonne)1	(US\$/tonne)	(tonnes)	(US\$)	(US\$)	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8 ((4-5*6)-7)	9
Rice	2008	Price support	506.65	223.78	220,870.22	0.00	62,477,559.13	Ministry of Foreign Trade on the basis of data provided by CONARROZ

- Average annual price. Legislation establishing administered prices for 2008:

  (i) Executive Decree No. 34111 of 16 November 2007, published in Official Journal La Gaceta No. 231 of 30 November 2007. The price was applied from 30 November 2007 to 26 May 2008.

  - 26 May 2008. (ii) Executive Decree No. 34525 of 8 May 2008, published in Official Journal La Gaceta No. 101 of 27 May 2008. The price was applied from 27 May 2008 to 22 July 2008. (iii) Executive Decree No. 34644 of 8 July 2008, published in Official Journal La Gaceta No. 142 of 23 July 2008. The price was applied from 23 July 2008 to 13 November 2008. (iv) Executive Decree No. 34870 of 10 November 2008, published in Official Journal La Gaceta No. 221 of 14 November 2008. The price was applied as from 14 November 2008.

## DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Costa Rica

#### REPORTING PERIOD: 2009

Current Total Aggregate Measurement of Support

Total AMS commitment level for period in question	Currency	Current total AMS		
(from Section I of Part IV of the Schedule)	(from Section I of Part IV of the Schedule)	(from attached Supporting Tables)		
1	2	3		
15,945.00	US\$ thousand <sup>1</sup>	91,743.86		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Average exchange rate for 2009: C568.32 to US\$1 (Source: Central Bank of Costa Rica).

Supporting Table DS:5

#### DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Costa Rica

## REPORTING PERIOD: 2009

Product-Specific Aggregate Measurements of Support: Market Price Support

narketing ning	g Measure type(s)	Applied administered price	External reference price (generally from AGST/)	Eligible production	Associated fees/levies	Total market price support	Data source
		(US\$/tonne)1	(US\$/tonne)	(tonnes)	(US\$)	(US\$)	
	3	4	5	6	7	8 ((4-5*6)-7)	9
9	Price support	581.30	223.78	256,611.82	0.00	91,743,857.89	Ministry of Foreign Trade on the basis of data provided by CONARROZ

Average annual price. Legislation establishing administered prices for 2009:
 (i) Executive Decree No. 34870 of 10 November 2008, published in Official Journal La Gaceta No. 221 of 14 November 2008. The price was applied from 14 November 2008 to 28 April 2009.
 (ii) Executive Decree No. 35189 of 24 March 2009, published in Official Journal La Gaceta No. 82 of 29 April 2009.
 The price was applied as from 29 April 2009.