WTO agricultural negotiations and their impact on trade of agricultural products among the OIC Member States

US and EU agricultural subsidies and their impact on OIC Member States

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The main sources and forms of the EU and US agricultural dumping

The examples of cotton, cereals and poultry

The wrong analysis of China, India and African group minimizing the dumping impact of the blue box and green box subsidies

All investments and inputs subsidies are trade-distorting

All Annex 2 subsidies are trade-distorting

$12.8 bn of US domestic food aid on 8 products was in the AMS in 2012

Alternative Agreement on Agriculture and food to reach the SDGs

The main sources and forms of the EU and US agricultural dumping

Without going back to colonial times the main reason of the persistance of the EU and US agricultural dumping lies in the criminal definition of dumping in GATT article VI: « no dumping as long as exports are made at the domestic price »

The EU & US used this definition to devise bilaterally the AoA rules while revising radically the CAP and Farm Bill (1992-93): large cuts in minimal administered prices (*intervention prices* in EU, *loan rates* in US), offsetting their impact on farmers by granting large domestic subsidies alleged non-trade distorting: blue & green box + de minimis

The main sources and forms of the EU and US agricultural dumping

It is a pity that most WTO Members, including DCs, are ignoring that the Appellate Body (AB) has ruled four times – in Dairy Products of Canada case of December 2001 & 2002, US cotton case of March 2005 and the EU sugar case of April 2005 – that all domestic subsidies (including the decoupled ones) must be included in assessing dumping.

At the same time the Appellate Body has given in the Dairy Canada case a clear definition of dumping as « *exports at prices lower than full average national production cost without subsidies* ».

The scandalous cotton subsidies of the US and even more of the EU and their disastrous impact on African producers

The best example of the absurdity of the AoA dumping rules is given by cotton: although the EU has the largest subsidy per tonne (t) and exports more cotton than Benin, Mali or Burkina, it notifies zero non-trade distorting subsidy to the WTO as 1/3 is notified in the Blue Box (BB) and 2/3 in the Green Box (GB), with average subsidy per tonne of $2,800 from 2010 to 2018, 6.6 times higher than the US $426 in the same period but the US subsidy rose to $557 in 2018 and 2019 (Market Facilitation & COVID-19 Programs).

The scandalous cotton subsidies of the US and even more of the EU and their disastrous impact on African producers

Even if the US has exported 9.5 times more cotton than the EU, the EU subsidies have weighed a lot also on the world cotton price, to the plight of the C4 producers. Yet, even if most models have concluded that the elimination of the US and EU dumping would raise the world price by around 10%, this would not solve the C4 plight as other countries would also raise their production, pushing down again the world price. But clearly they should stop dumping.

The scandalous cotton subsidies of the US and even more of the EU and their disastrous impact on African producers

In 2019 the EU exported 1,6 million tonnes (Mt) of worn clothes for $1.36 billion (bn) at a FOB price of 856 $/t, of which 46% (739,000 t) to OIC at a price 40% lower (515 $/t), and 581,000 t to SSA for $591 M, of which $345 M to West Africa, of which $55.7 M to C4 (63,734 t). The EU exported 2.1 times more worn clothes than the US and 8 times to OIC.

The long term solution is certainly not to agree with the AGOA "third country duty free import of yarn and fabrics" which would cut drastically the SSA production of cotton lint.

The scandalous cotton subsidies of the US and even more of the EU and their disastrous impact on African producers

As the textile industry has been at the basis of development of all developing countries and has created a huge amount of jobs, there is an urgency for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to regain control of its cotton chain, processing its cotton lint in clothes to reduce exports and stop imports, including of worn clothes.



US cotton exports to the world from 2010 to 2019
$ million
1,000 tonnes
$/tonne
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
5734
8386
6225
5592
4396
3889
3959
5827
6550
6141
2956
2760
2752
2790
2167
2396
2469
3252
3576
3562
1939
3038
2262
2004
2029
1623
1604
1792
1831
1724



US cotton exports to OIC States from 2010 to 2019
$ million
1,000 tonnes
$/tonne
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
1927
3125
2213
1941
1975
1592
1555
1777
1794
1694
1547
2470
1106
1491
1411
1069
1223
1935
2456
2242
803
790
500
768
715
671
787
1089
1369
1323



US cotton subsidies to the world: 2010-19
RMA
CCC
GB
Total subsidies
RMA: insurance subsidies; CCC: other coupled subsidies; GB: Green Box
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
955
1836
1529
1303
1550
1546
1466
1366
2308
2330
414
938
622
519
578
594
621
835
980
808
219
432
514
398
667
625
662
321
1037
1214
322
466
393
386
305
327
183
210
291
308

US subsidies on cotton exports to OIC States: 2010-19




EU cotton exports from 2010 to 2019
€ million
1,000 tonnes
€/tonne
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
1624
1781
1417
1445
1334
1387
1457
1512
1616
1464
395
291
486
411
373
337
396
393
377
634
243
163
343
284
280
243
272
260
233
433


EU cotton exports to OIC States from 2010 to 2019
€ million
1,000 tonnes
€/tonne
500
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
1603
1745
1388
1429
1284
1347
1436
1503
1611
1460
273
126
301
255
231
214
220
260
197
443
171
72
217
179
180
159
154
173
123
303
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019


EU cotton subsidies and dumping rate from 2010 to 2019
Subsidy/tonne
Export subsidies
Dumping rate
Total and export subsidies in €million
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
250%
200%
150%
100%
50%
0%
3456
214%
2393
136%
184%
2594
168%
2413
178%
2322
221%
2995
204%
2917
163%
131%
132%
1927
806
373
867
666
635
711
772
640
495
835
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019


The average EU cotton dumping rate was 6.3 times higher than the US
US dumping rate
EU/US dumping rate
EU dumping rate
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
250
200
150
100
50
0
214
136
184
168
178
221
204
163
131
132
16,7
21,3
25,1
24,1
36,2
40,5
38,1
23,6
36
38,6
12,8
6,4
7,3
7
4,9
5,5
5,3
6,9
3,6
3,4
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019


The EU and US cotton subsidy per tonne exported to OIC States: 2010-2019
EU $/tonne
US $/tonne
3672
2552
2740
2507
2410
3104
3020
2584
2292
1999
323
666
556
467
715
645
593
420
646
654
The EU cotton subsidy per tonne exported to OIC States has been 4.7 times higher on average than the US one from 2010 to 2019
4000
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019



US exports of worn clothes to the world from 2010 to 2019
$ million
1,000 tonnes
$/tonne
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
628
796
825
882
878
809
754
794
886
881
720
756
762
769
763
708
733
766
745
755
452
602
629
678
670
573
553
608
660
665


US exports of worn clothes to OIC States from 2010 to 2019
1,000 tonnes
$ million
$/tonne
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
107
103
99
113
95
84
96
89
92
70
74
92
108
96
75
69
86
80
655
724
927
959
1002
890
889
750
963
872



EU exports of worn clothes from 2010 to 2019
€ million
1,000 tonnes
€/tonne
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
1030
1085
1146
1177
1224
1292
1303
1393
1468
1591
835
937
1116
1191
1157
1193
1199
1265
1266
1312
810
864
974
1012
946
924
920
908
862
825


EU exports of worn clothes to OIC States from 2010 to 2019
€ million
1,000 tonnes
€/tonne
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
583
586
692
746
682
648
575
560
518
496
369
395
431
463
526
565
534
588
659
739
215
232
298
346
359
366
307
329
341
367

Taking into account Green Box subsidies in assessing dumping

Decoupled aids are the most trade distorting as they can rise without limits. US and EU aids to specific products add the same share of GB as that of its value in whole agricultural production value. We take US GB notified to WTO minus 93.1% of domestic food aid (6.9% is a subsidy to farmers for Rashmi Banga), minus notified decoupled support plus $2 bn of irrigation subsidies (GAO and CRS reports) and energy subsidies notified to OECD at $2.385 bn up to 2012, $1.038 bn up to 2016 before revising at $811 M from 2007 and at $777M from 2015 to 2019! EU domestic food aid is insignificant and we delete decoupled income (taken already for each product) and add €2 bn of irrigation subsidies and €3 bn of energy subsidies (€3 bn in OECD data).

US and EU cereals exports to OIC States, 2010 to 2019

EU exports of cereals to OIC – in cereals weight equivalent (CWE) with the raw cereals included in processed cereals – were 42% larger on average than US exports (15,8 million t, Mt, against 11,1 Mt) although with an average FOB price 25% lower (205 $/t against 273 $/t in the US).

As the US is the first exporter & price maker of cereals, the EU average subsidy/t of CWE, from 2010 to 2019, was twice the US one (63.8 $/t against 30.8 $/t), the more so as the share of raw cereals in processed cereals was much lower than in the EU: 0,7% of all CWE, against 5,5% for EU. EU average dumping rate remains 3 times higher than the EU one: 33% against 11,4%.


US subsidies to total raw cereals from 2010 to 2019
Cereals production: Mt
subsidies/tonne
CCC+ MFP+COVID
RMA
Green Box
CCC, RMA & GB subsidies in $M
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
401
386
356
434
443
432
503
467
468
435
32,03
39,71
47,55
33,03
27,02
18,16
25,07
24,92
31,18
29,63
4041
3888
3084
3591
3790
503
5921
4992
6989
2606
5343
7754
5743
4131
3198
2402
2651
3270
4244
6203
6079
6102
5010
4046
4143
4301
3990
4330
4309

US exports of raw cereals to OIC States: 2010-2019




US subsidies to cereal products exports to OIC: 2010-19
Dumping rate
CWE Mt
Subsidies $M
CWE: cereals weight equivalent in million tonnes
16,00%
14,00%
12,00%
10,00%
8,00%
6,00%
4,00%
2,00%
0,00%
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
13,20%
11,74%
14,23%
9,67%
9,53%
6,94%
11,56%
11,43%
14,04%
11,83%
533,9
706,7
390,1
287,6
284,3
145
266,7
271,8
340,7
263,2
16,669
17,796
8,203
8,707
10,52
7,986
10,639
10,905
10,926
8,882
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019



EU exports of raw cereals to OIC States from 2010 to 2019
1,000 tonnes
€ million
€/tonne
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
10910
11470
11230
17998
18307
20236
19657
16010
15873
16160
1906
2756
2772
3992
3715
3996
3288
2756
2965
3036
175
240
247
222
203
197
167
172
187
188


EU subsidies to cereals exports to OIC States : 2010-19
CWE
Subsidies
Dumping rate
CWE: 1000 t of cereals weight equivalent; subsidies in € million;
dumping rates: subsidies on CWE divided by raw cereals value
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
45,00%
40,00%
35,00%
30,00%
25,00%
20,00%
15,00%
10,00%
5,00%
0,00%
37,81%
27,36%
26,70%
28,88%
31,62%
32,53%
38,42%
37,83%
34,82%
34,48%
11777
12319
12095
18838
19197
21240
20642
17038
16872
17104
721
754
740
1153
1175
1300
1263
1043
1033
1047
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019

US and EU exports of poultry to OIC States from 2010 to 2019

Feed subsidies are almost the only ones to poultry (and hogs) farmers in the EU and US, if we except the EU refunds up to 2013, as they did not receive direct income aids. But the US and EU deny the reality of feed subsidies to the producers of animal products (meat, eggs and milk) as they are received by the producers of feed crops – cereals, oilseed meals, pulses (COPs) – even though 2/3 are devoted to domestic feed. Indeed the US and EU animal producers get actually these feed subsidies as they would have to buy them at much higher prices if the producers of COPs did not receive these subsidies: it is the concept of « cross-subsidization » which also denies the false OECD concept of « excess feed cost ».

US and EU exports of poultry to OIC States from 2010 to 2019

After showing the quantity, value and FOB prices of the US and EU poultry and eggs exports to OIC – where the US exported 57% more on average : 538,000 t against 342,000 t – we divide raw poultry export tonnage by 0.72 to get liveweight tonnage, times 2 to get feed weight, of which 75% is made of cereals and 25% of soymeal. As the EU soymeal is imported and gets no subsidies the protein feed of EU origin (oilseed meals and pulses) is of 15% only.

US average subsidy/t of raw exports ($11.25) was 2.4 times lower than in EU ($32.26) because of high EU export refunds up to 2013, but only 29% lower in 2018-2019 (MFP&COVI19 programmes). Dumping rates were closer: 12.7%&16.1%, but 66% higher in US in 2018&19.



US exports of poultry to EAC States from 2010 to 2019
1,000 tonnes
$million
FOB $/t
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
481 568 741 803 748 658 724 714 668 544
382 537 727 786 679 483 502 553 521 463
795 945 981 979 907 734 694 775 780 851
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019


From raw weight of US poultry exports to OIC to total feed, from cereals and soymeal, 1,000 t, 2010-19
Raw weight
CWE
Liveweight
Total feed
Cereals feed
Soymeal
CWE: Carcass weight equivalent; live weight: CWE divided by 72%; Total feed: twice the live weight
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
1335
1578
2057
2230
2079
1827
2012
1982
1855
1512
1002
1183
1543
1672
1559
1370
1509
1487
1391
1134
668
789
1029
1115
1039
914
1006
991
928
756
480
568
741
803
748
658
724
714
668
544
397
465
589
649
605
528
588
581
543
434
334
394
514
557
520
457
503
496
464
378


US feed subsidies to poultry exports to OIC, $M: 2010-19
Subsidies/cereals feed
Subsidies/soymeal
Total subsidies
Dumping rate
120000
100000
80000
60000
40000
20000
0
25,00%
20,00%
15,00%
10,00%
5,00%
0,00%
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
50270
72776
105343
89125
44346
40950
60682
57775
106587
74435
32079
46980
73364
55238
24885
37821
37044
43383
33590
18191
25795
31979
33887
22176
16065
22861
20732
63205
40845
13,15%
13,55%
14,49%
11,34%
6,53%
8,48%
12,08%
10,45%
20,46%
16,08%


EU exports of poultry to OIC States from 2010 to 2019
1000 tonnes
€ 1,00
€/tonne
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
2000
1800
1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
1418
1537
1660
1670
1608
1721
1407
1515
1641
1850
440
591
634
671
633
664
492
471
440
430
310
384
382
402
393
386
349
311
268
232

From raw weight of EU poultry exports to OIC to feed weight, of which in cereals and EU oilseed meals and pulses: 2010-19



Subsidies to the EU poultry exports to OIC States: 2010 to 2019



US & EU subsidies per tonne & dumping rates of poultry exports to OIC: 2010-19



The wrong analysis of China, India and the African group minimizing the dumping impact of the blue box and green box subsidies

It is very unfortunate that China, India and the African Group at the WTO have focused their main criticisms against the developed countries amber box – so called AMS –, the more so as they did not realize that about 90% of their notified AMS is a fake market price support (MPS) not implying actual subsidies, because it does not bring additional support to that of other measures: import duties, export restrictions, land set aside, production quotas, foreign and domestic food aid. If the MPS is notified in the supporting table DS:5, when the products get actual subsidies they are notified in supporting table DS:6 (non-exempt direct payments) or DS:7 (other product-specific AMS).

The developed countries AMS is a fake market price support

In 8 Western developed countries the MPS accounted for 72.8% of their notified AMS, of which 98.1% for Canada, 96.6% for the EU28 and even 106.8% for Norway (!), so that the actual subsidies in the AMS was of only 27.2%.
If the MPS is of only 38.8% of US AMS, it is because it has deleted the dairy MPS since the 2014 reform of the Farm Bill. And, from 2008 to 2013, it has hugely under-notified its dairy MPS, with a huge impact on its allowed final bound AMS which is not at \$19.1 bn but at \$16.6 bn.

The EU28 agricultural budget outturn among boxes: 1995/00 to 2018, € million



The diversion of AoA article 6.2 by the developed countries

According to the AoA article 6.2 "investment subsidies which are generally available to agriculture in developing country Members and agricultural input subsidies generally available to low-income or resource-poor producers in developing country Members shall be exempt from domestic support reduction commitments *that would otherwise be applicable to such measures*".

If this article is understood as the DCs « development box », the developed countries have ignored the last words "*that would otherwise be applicable to such measures*" and did not notify to the WTO in their AMS but in the Green Box most investments subsidies and inputs subsidies, particularly the largest: to feed.

Other AoA provisions on inputs and investment subsidies

Annex III paragraph 13 provides: "*Other non-exempt measures, including input subsidies and other measures such as marketing-cost reduction measures*".

For Annex IV paragraph 4: "*Measures directed at agricultural processors shall be included to the extent that such measures benefit the producers of the basic agricultural products*".

Why all AoA Annex 2 provisions are trade-distorting

Paragraph 1.a: "*the support in question shall be provided through a publicly-funded government programme… not involving transfers from consumers*": the distinction between market price support – financed by consumers – and subsidy – financed by taxpayers – is not convincing since the vast majority of taxes are ultimately passed on to consumers.

Paragraph 1.b:"*the support in question shall not have the effect of providing price support to producers*": even decoupled income support provides clear price support to producers as the prices would necessarily be higher without these subsidies.

Why all AoA Annex 2 provisions are trade-distorting

Paragraph 2.g states that expenditures on agricultural infra-stuctures "*shall not include subsidies to inputs or operating costs*“.

Paragraph 11 on "*Structural adjustment assistance provided through investment aids*" are in the GB only “*in response to objectively demonstrated structural disadvantages*", a limit that developed countries have ignored. All EU investments subsidies are in the CAP “second pillar” on rural development notified in the GB.

Even Annex 2 subsidies are actionnable under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures when specific and causing adverse effects to other WTO Members.

Other AoA provisions on inputs and investment subsidies

Annex III paragraph 13 provides: "*Other non-exempt measures, including input subsidies and other measures such as marketing-cost reduction measures*".

For Annex IV paragraph 4: "*Measures directed at agricultural processors shall be included to the extent that such measures benefit the producers of the basic agricultural products*".

The EU decoupled income support is in the AMS

1) It is coupled to agricultural area: farmers must show they have eligible hectares; 2) it is coupled with the BB "*under production-limiting programmes*, among which to cotton, coupling their decoupled aid loosing a full production flexibility; 3) decoupled aids to feed and biofuels are input subsidies; 4) it contradicts condition that "*No production shall be required… to receive such payments*" but the EU requires to maintain "*minimum stocking rates*"; 5) as it cannot be assigned to a particular product, it can be assigned to any product of which it lowers the sale price below the EU average total national production cost, AB dumping definition.

The developed countries AMS is a fake market price support

In 8 Western developed countries the MPS accounted for 72.8% of their notified AMS, of which 98.1% in Canada, 96.6% in the EU and even 106.8% in Norway (!), so that the actual subsidies in the AMS were of only 27.2%. If the MPS is of only 38.8% of the US AMS, it is because it has deleted the dairy MPS since the 2014 reform of the Farm Bill. And, from 2008 to 2013, it has hugely under-notified its dairy MPS, so that its allowed final bound AMS is not $19.1 bn but $16.6 bn.

Denouncing the US stance on Public stockholding for food security purposes

As the US refuses DCs arguments the same absurd methodology shows the US DFA was of $12.8 bn in 2012 for 8 basic DFA products

AMS of 8 products of the US DFA in 2012

	1000 t	Adm price	Refer price	Adm-Refer prices	AMS
Wheat flour	3664	337,1	90,4	246,7	904
Corn flour	1067	319,1	78,5	240,6	256,7
Rice	417	581,9	407,6	129,8	154
Beef	1667	5758,2	1522,5	4235,7	9378,6
Pork	1194	2265,6	1464,6	801	1270,9
Poultry	2250	1913,2	1084,5	828,7	2476,5
Dairy	12540	421,1	176,1	245	3072,3
Eggs	671	1405,2	779,1	626,1	420
Total	22180				12785

Alternative Agreement on Agriculture and Food to reach the SDGs

The objective of the AoAF is to contribute to food sovereignty of WTO Members, unlike the AoA first objective prioritizing access to other Members' market with "*substantial progressive reductions in agricultural support and protection*". This implies that Members shall refrain from any export dumping and from importing agricultural and food products violating human, social and environmental rights in their countries & exporting countries.

This does not imply food self-sufficiency, that many Members are unable to achieve, but the freedom to choose the openness of its agricultural and food imports, including their free trade.

Alternative Agreement on Agriculture and Food to reach the SDGs

The distinction in the AoA and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) between non-specific subsidies and specific subsidies, and between export subsidies and domestic subsidies in the Amber, Blue or Green Boxes, has no scientific basis and should be abolished: all subsidies reduce the export price below the national average total cost of production and increase the competitiveness of the products receiving them. They have both a dumping effect when exported and an import substitution effect identical to that of customs duties.

Alternative Agreement on Agriculture and Food to reach the SDGs

The AoAF will rest on a hierarchy of norms subjecting WTO agricultural trade rules to international human, social and environmental rights rules. To make them effective, one of the three members of the Panels and Appellate Body appointed for a dispute should be an expert in international conventions on human and social rights and the environment.

Thanks so much to have read these slides

Please send your comments at: jacques.berthelot4@wanadoo.fr

Look https://www.sol-asso.fr/analyses-politiques-agricoles-jacques-berthelot-2020/

Recommanded papers (most are in French but I mention only the link to English ones)

https://www.sol-asso.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Reconciling-the-views-on-a-permanent-solution-to-the-isssue-of-public-stockholding-for-food-security-purposes-1.pdf

https://www.sol-asso.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Analysis-of-the-main-controversies-on-domestic-agricultural-supports-29-July-2016.pdf

https://www.sol-asso.fr/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/SOLs-alternative-methodology-to-IATP-assessment-of-agricultural-dumping-January-1-2017.pdf

https://www.sol-asso.fr/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Unifying-the-developing-countries-stances-on-the-Green-and-Blue-Boxes-SOL-12-13-2019.pdf

https://www.sol-asso.fr/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Rebuilding-the-WTO-for-a-sustainable-global-development-J.-Berthelot-July-12-2020.pdf

https://www.sol-asso.fr/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Agreement-on-Agriculture-and-Food-AoAF-SOLs-proposal-of-22-January-2019.pdf